The International Situation: Fear of Invasion and Growing Authoritarianism by Whitewood, Peter
Whitewood, Peter (2020) The
International Situation: Fear of Invasion and Growing 
Authoritarianism. In: Douds, Lara, Harris, James and Whitewood, 
Peter, (eds.) The Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution: Illiberal 
Liberation, 1917-1941. Library of Modern Russia . London, 
Bloomsbury, pp. 173-186  
Downloaded from: http://ray.yorksj.ac.uk/id/eprint/3732/
The version presented here may differ from the published version or version of record. If 
you intend to cite from the work you are advised to consult the publisher's version:
https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/the-fate-of-the-bolshevik-revolution-9781350117907/
Research at York St John (RaY) is an institutional repository. It supports the principles of 
open access by making the research outputs of the University available in digital form. 
Copyright of the items stored in RaY reside with the authors and/or other copyright 
owners. Users may access full text items free of charge, and may download a copy for 
private study or non-commercial research. For further reuse terms, see licence terms 
governing individual outputs. Institutional Repository Policy Statement
RaY
Research at the University of York St John 
For more information please contact RaY at ray@yorksj.ac.uk
The International Situation: Fear of Invasion and Growing Authoritarianism 
Peter Whitewood
For Vladimir Lenin and the Bolsheviks, the primary function of their revolution in 1917 was 
to spark further uprisings in the more advanced countries of Western Europe. This would 
bring forth worldwide revolution and usher in world communism. For them, this was the only
role that a revolution in a struggling empire with a large peasant majority, an underdeveloped 
working class and backwards-industrial base, could possibly play. In fact the revolution 
would not survive without spreading further afield. As a result, when European revolution 
failed to ignite, the Bolsheviks faced a serious security dilemma: Russia was surrounded by 
countries with governments hostile to communism. Civil war that erupted in 1918 only 
underlined the precarious position of the Soviet government. Western capitalist powers – 
Britain, France and the United States – all gave financial and material support to the 
Bolsheviks’ enemies, first in an effort to keep the eastern front open against Germany and 
then in an effort to snuff out the Soviet government. As far as Lenin was concerned, this was 
evidence of capitalist encirclement.
Bolshevik victory in the civil war did not provide a sense of security. Even though the 
immediate danger to the revolution had been overcome, the Bolsheviks would never forget 
the assistance given to their enemies by capitalist powers. Moreover, the Bolsheviks were 
convinced that the capitalist world would never reconcile to their revolutionary state and 
would continue to seek its destruction. All of this heightened the dangers posed by the outside
world and there were serious consequences. Historians have recently given more attention to 
Bolshevik leaders’ misperceptions of foreign threats and how this explains their use of 
political violence.1 Yet less attention has been given to how Bolshevik perceptions of the 
international situation shaped the dictatorship itself in the 1920s.2 This chapter will show how
a perpetual fear of foreign intervention encouraged Bolshevik leaders to retreat from the 
democratic impulses of 1917 and from the workers democracy promised at the outset of the 
revolution. The Bolshevik Party was instead pushed further towards authoritarian practices, 
accelerating the consolidation of a one-party vanguard-led state that placed growing limits on
intraparty discussion. Perceived security concerns shared across the Soviet elite were a 
powerful force in the weakening of democratic practices in the 1920s.
In examining how the Bolsheviks understood the outside world and the impact this had on 
democratic practices, this chapter will concentrate on the perceived threat of war between 
Poland and the Soviet Union. This was the most common foreign policy preoccupation for 
the Bolsheviks in the 1920s. Indeed, having experienced stunning defeat against the Poles at 
the Battle of Warsaw in August 1920 - a clash that brought the Soviet-Polish War to a close - 
the Bolsheviks fully expected renewed war against Poland, supported by powerful capitalist 
states, in the years after.
Fears of Renewed War, 1921–3
After narrowly avoiding defeat by the White Armies and interventionist foreign powers at the
height of the civil war, the Bolsheviks found themselves in more secure circumstances in the 
early 1920s. Appraising the outside world in February 1921, Lenin proclaimed that the 
‘greatest danger point’ to the revolution had passed. He saw major conflict in the near future 
as a risky undertaking for capitalist powers facing economic crises and rising revolutionary 
movements at home. Yet Lenin warned against complacency: the external threat had not been
eliminated.3 Open war against the capitalist world was unavoidable and until then, the 
revolution - isolated in the world - would be forced to exist under conditions of capitalist 
encirclement.
It was in this context that the Bolsheviks judged newly reconstituted Poland as the most 
dangerous international threat to the revolution. The Soviet–Polish War officially ended when
the Treaty of Riga was signed on 18 March 1921, but this was nothing more than an uneasy 
compromise (with the majority of treaty conditions ultimately going unfulfilled).4 For this 
reason, failure to usher in peaceful relations in 1921 has been described as the starting point 
of a cold war between the two countries.5 Indeed, formal peace did little to ease Bolshevik 
concerns that the Entente would once again push Poland into war when the time was right. 
Lenin made precisely this point prior to the signing of the treaty in early 1921. Even though 
he saw war as a risky undertaking for the revolution’s enemies, Lenin proclaimed that foreign
capitalists were ‘spending millions and millions to organise another invasion in spring.’ Yet 
without the assistance of a pliable state bordering Soviet territory he argued, these efforts 
would come to nothing. It was Poland (and Romania) - sold to the capitalists ‘lock, stock, and
barrel’ and vulnerable to manipulation – who might ‘rush headlong into the craziest 
adventures.’6 For Lenin, despite the formal end of hostilities against Poland, the international 
situation remained precarious. 
Lenin was not alone in this reading of the outside world. The Soviet political police estimated
that a new military attack might come in spring or summer 1921 and pointed to extensive 
activity of Polish intelligence agents in Ukraine.7 Similarly, Bolshevik negotiators at the 
peace talks with Poland in 1921 could not discount a rapid resumption of hostilities. Soviet 
representative Adolf Ioffe, for instance, suggested to People’s Commissar for Finance, 
Nikolai Krestinskii, that the Bolsheviks accept the Polish government’s demands for gold as 
deliveries could be staggered over two or three years, staving off another invasion during this 
time.8 There were some moderate voices in the early 1920s. The People’s Commissariat of 
Foreign Affairs tended to report a more benign picture of the foreign threat in 1921. People’s 
Commissar Georgii Chicherin, for instance, received a stream of diplomatic reports 
describing consensus within the Polish government for quickly achieving a peace treaty, yet 
these equally stressed continuing international hostility towards Soviet Russia and concerted 
efforts spearheaded by the French to create a union of anti-Soviet border-states.9
It is clear that the Bolsheviks did not rule out another military clash against Poland after the 
Treaty of Riga and this soon shaped strategies for new international alliances. In October 
1921, Maksim Litvinov, Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, recommended that 
the Bolsheviks arrange a defensive alliance with Germany because Poland was likely to 
remain a ‘“sword of Damocles” hanging over our heads.’ (The Soviet foreign ministry would 
later warn of imminent war against Poland and Romania in early 1922.)10 Commissar for 
War, Leon Trotsky, in an order from the Revolutionary Military Council from November 
1921, took aim at a shadowy military clique in Poland headed by Józef Piłsudski pushing for 
renewed war and stressed that the Red Army needed to be prepared for the worst.11 Yet as we 
have seen, Poland was regarded as the instrument of war; the Bolsheviks continued to see the 
British and French governments as the crucial backers.
As had been true in the previous war against Poland, the Bolsheviks identified Ukraine as a 
weak spot in their defences and as a potential bridgehead in a future clash with the west. 
Consequently the western front, in comparison to other civil war fronts, was converted to 
peacetime military district status only in April 1924.12 Mikhail Tukhachevskii, famed 
commander of the 1920 Battle of Warsaw, returned to oversee the western front between 
January 1922 and March 1924. Moreover, banditry in Ukraine, coordinated by separatist 
leaders such as Symon Petliura (and given covert support by Polish intelligence) was at times
interpreted by the Soviet political police as directed by Poland in advance of a military 
assault.13 The activity of bandits in the borderlands was a common source of complaint in 
Soviet notes to the Polish government and tied to the potential resumption of hostilities.14 
Fears about imminent war were eased - or at least downplayed - by senior Bolsheviks at the 
Eleventh Party Congress held between March and April 1922. The congress recognised that 
Poland (and Romania) had represented direct threats in autumn 1921 but that peace had been 
ensured because of military preparations and effective diplomacy.15 Nevertheless, further 
intelligence about a military attack quickly filtered through to the leadership. Sergei 
Kamenev, commander in chief of the Red Army, reported to Iosif Stalin at the end of April 
that recent intelligence indicated that Poland and Romania were considering launching 
military action in late spring or early summer. According to Kamenev, a military meeting in 
Romania had been attended not only by the Polish military attaché but also by representatives
of the French government, Petliura and the White General Petr Wrangel’.16 This news was 
followed up two weeks later with a report from the political police’s foreign department 
describing ‘serious discussions’ in Latvia about a possible conflict between Poland and 
Russia.17 Soviet intelligence reported over the coming months on French-Polish-Romania 
military cooperation, the movement of Polish troops to the borders of Ukraine and the 
possibility of a new attack if conditions were right to spark the internal collapse of the 
Bolshevik state.18 The French government was rightly presented in these materials as striving 
to create a unified Polish and Romanian military force for potential action in Russia and to be
held in reserve against Germany. Soviet intelligence agents also accurately assessed Poland’s 
inability to wage war independently. This was only possible with the assistance of powerful 
countries to bankroll a new conflict. For the party leadership, however, none of this made war
any less inevitable in the future.19 By the end of 1922, rumours about war continued to circle 
when Mikhail Frunze, commander of the Ukrainian military district, received a report on 
‘lively’ discussions in Polish military circles about war in the east and the supposed efforts by
Petliura’s bands to encourage Polish intervention.20 In early 1923, Soviet intelligence agents 
in Ukraine were tasked with obtaining Polish, Latvian and Estonian mobilisation plans.21
Fears about a new war were significantly heightened when international crisis erupted in 
Western Europe in 1923 after French and Belgian troops occupied the Ruhr industrial region 
in January following the failure of the German government to meet its reparations payments. 
Hyperinflation soon hit the Germany economy sparking a strike wave across German cities 
that culminated in the failed Hamburg insurrection in October. The Politburo threw its 
support behind the German Communist Party in the summer, envisaging another revolution. 
But with revolutionary optimism came fears of new war. For some Bolsheviks, a conflict 
with Poland was now more likely than ever. Until the collapse of the German uprising 
became clear in the autumn, the prospect of Polish military intervention to quash the 
insurrection was taken seriously (the Bolsheviks believed that the Polish government would 
never permit their country to be surrounded on both sides by revolutionary states). There was 
now serious talk in Bolshevik circles of using the Red Army to protect the nascent German 
revolution as the crisis matured.22 Trotsky in particular was determined to go to war if 
necessary, writing to Karl Radek at the outset of the crisis that the Bolsheviks could not stand
aside if Poland attacked Germany.23 Grigorii Zinoviev, the most prominent supporter of the 
German communists, like Trotsky, wanted more resources committed to the army.24 At the 
Twelfth Party Congress in April 1923, Zinoviev proclaimed that the occupation of the Ruhr 
meant that war had in fact already arrived; it was merely war by other means.25 
For this reason, during the course of 1923 Soviet military and GPU intelligence agents kept a 
close eye on potentially threatening troop movements and mobilisations. They reported that 
the French general staff believed that war with Germany would evolve into war against 
Russia and that military union with Poland was an essential part of French strategy towards 
Germany.26 Soviet intelligence tracked the movements of French marshal Ferdinand Foch and
his efforts to forge a military alliance between France, Poland and other border states in the 
event of war with Russia.27 Alarmingly, Soviet intelligence from March noted that a majority 
within the Polish general staff now believed that another war should be launched against 
Russia to overthrow Soviet power and guarantee the Polish eastern border. Other reports 
noted the build up of Polish military supplies in border regions and on the right bank of the 
Vistula.28 GPU operatives on the ground in Ukraine recorded that Polish representatives were 
discussing war and the possibility of Polish troops being sent to Kiev.29 Soviet intelligence 
reported on the adaption of Polish railways to match those in Eastern Ukraine.30 The Red 
Army began to war-game possible conflicts, accepting that the international situation in 
Western and Central Europe made armed conflict between the Soviet Union and Poland, 
Romania and White organisations, inevitable.31 
That the Bolsheviks took the threat of war seriously in 1923 can also be seen in the secret 
military preparations undertaken during the crisis. The Red Army in general terms was in no 
condition to fight in a major conflict, something that had been laid bare in a report on Soviet 
defences in May 1923. This judged the Red Army as clearly lagging behind Polish Army and 
called for its urgent strengthening.32 Other weaknesses in Soviet defences had also been 
highlighted during the year. Head of the GPU, Feliks Dzerzhinskii, described problems in 
Soviet transport infrastructure and the inability to efficiently move troops. He concluded that 
Poland would be able to carry out a successful short strike towards Kiev.33 Concrete plans for 
war were thus put into motion, particularly as the crisis in Germany reached a peak.34 On 18 
September 1923, the Politburo ordered a strengthening of Red Army units on the western 
front, in the Ukrainian military district and in air defence.35 The following day, the 
Revolutionary Military Council ordered an increase in the number of political officers on the 
western front.36 In October, student communists were called up as political officers on the 
western front and demobilised Red Army men returned to the ranks.37 In November, Soviet 
industry officials in Ukraine began to secretly prepare for the evacuation of enterprises, 
factories and workers in the border region in case war suddenly erupted.38 Rumours of war 
were now widespread.39 The Ukrainian GPU recorded lively conversations about forthcoming
war among Poles.40 Polish intelligence agents likewise reported that Kiev was alive with 
signs of preparation for new conflict.41 
Despite growing anxiety about a clash with Poland and the raft of military preparations, war 
never materialised. The Hamburg uprising fizzled out almost as soon as it began, bringing the
wider crisis to an end. However, what matters is how the Bolshevik leaders had misperceived
the threat of war in 1923. There were undoubtedly certain circles in Poland – particularly 
within the military and intelligence services – pushing for war in 1923. However, the centre-
right National Democrats dominated Polish politics during that year. Their priority was closer
economic relations with Russia, not launching another invasion. The National Democrats 
disagreed entirely with the aggressive approach championed by Piłsudski and his supporters. 
In fact, Piłsudski had resigned as chief of the general staff in May and his allies were 
subsequently ousted from government. The years 1923 to 1925 saw Polish policy towards 
Russia more firmly reoriented towards seeking trade agreements. Notably, the Polish 
government recognised the formation of Soviet Union in December 1923.42 In short, voices 
clamouring for war near the Polish government were weakened at the very moment that the 
Bolsheviks took the threat of war most seriously. The 1923 war scare reveals how 
precariously the Bolsheviks viewed their position in the world and the degree to which they 
misperceived the nature of foreign threats.
Capitalist Encirclement and Dictatorship
The international crisis of 1923 coincided with rising political opposition inside the 
Bolshevik Party. At the height of the crisis in October, Trotsky and the Left Opposition 
launched a scathing attack on the party majority, criticising it – and Stalin in particular – of 
presiding over the bureaucratisation of party life, the creation of a secretarial hierarchy and 
for placing limits on internal discussion and intraparty criticism. The response from the party 
majority to this challenge was shaped by a number of priorities, but it is clear that perceived 
threats of invasion and capitalist encirclement, unbroken since the end of the civil war, played
important roles in the shutting down of Trotsky and his supporters. Lenin had already 
established this as a precedent. In early 1921, when tensions were running high about the 
resumption of hostilities against Poland, Lenin and the party majority faced criticism from 
minority political groups, the Workers’ Opposition and Democratic Centralists. Both 
criticised weak democratic practices, the growing bureaucracy and inadequate worker 
representation in senior party bodies.43 At the time Lenin responded that these problems could
not be immediately remedied for a number of reasons, not least because workers lacked 
adequate experience of government, but also because the threatening international situation 
made dictatorship necessary. In an article published in Pravda in January 1921, Lenin 
argued: 
The Entente capitalists will surely try to take advantage of our Party’s malaise 
[political disputes] to mount another invasion […] We need have no fear of this 
because we shall all unite as one man, without being afraid to admit the malaise, 
but recognising that it demands from all of us a greater discipline, tenacity and 
firmness at every post.44 
In his opening speech to the Tenth Party Congress two months later – which approved the 
ban on factions in the party – Lenin proclaimed that past discussions and disputes had been 
an ‘amazing luxury’ for a party shouldering such responsibilities and ‘surrounded by mighty 
and powerful enemies uniting the whole capitalist world.’ Lenin again argued that foreign 
powers were taking advantage of internal party disputes, with foreign presses spreading 
rumours of communist weaknesses.45 None of this is to say that the Bolsheviks’ perception of
international relations was the sole cause of the ban of factions. Yet it is clear that for Lenin 
at least, at a time when the country faced powerful enemies from within and without, the 
party needed to be more united than ever before. 
Lenin reiterated the necessity of dictatorship with similar justifications at the Third Congress 
of the Communist International held between June and July 1921: ‘This dictatorship is 
essential as long as classes exist, as long as the bourgeoisie, overthrown in one country, 
intensifies tenfold its attacks on socialism on an international scale.’ Describing dictatorship 
as a ‘state of intense war’, Lenin argued that resistance from the working classes around the 
world was the only restraining force on the international bourgeoisie, though war could 
‘never be ruled out’.46 In this context, free political organisation could not be permitted. As 
Lenin explained to the oppositionist Gavriil Miasnikov in a letter from August 1921, this 
would simply give another weapon to the world bourgeoisie.47  
Similar criticisms were aired at the Eleventh Party Congress in the following year. Here, 
senior Bolsheviks again cast calls for stronger democratic practices as impermissible in a 
dangerous international environment. Criticising Aleksander Shliapnikov, leader of the 
Workers’ Opposition, Lenin argued against free political organisation and emphasised the 
threat of war as the primary danger: 
I have indicated the three conditions under which it will be possible for us to hold
on: first, that there shall be no intervention; second, that the financial crisis shall 
not be too severe; and third, that we shall make no political mistakes […] Of 
course, even today the bourgeoisie may attempt another armed intervention, but 
they will find it much more difficult than before; it is much more difficult today 
than it was yesterday. To ensure ourselves the opportunity to learn we must make 
no political mistakes. We must waste no time playing with the unity of the Party, 
as Comrade Shlyapnikov is doing.48 
Trotsky was likewise critical of opposition in the party at the congress and claimed that 
hostile states were turning this to their advantage: ‘It is not an accident that the radio station 
of the Polish government sent extracts from comrade Miasnikov’s pamphlet out to the whole 
world.’ Trotsky also remarked that the writings of Aleksandra Kollontai, a figure closely 
associated with the Workers’ Opposition, were being quoted abroad.49 The congress 
ultimately deemed the activity of the Workers’ Opposition impermissible for several reasons: 
the continuing difficult economic circumstances, the presence of ‘capitalist elements’ in 
Russia, the spread of famine and the threat of invasion.50
Similarly, in the year of Ruhr crisis and at the Twelfth Party Congress in April 1923, Lev 
Kamenev discussed the international position of the revolution and the question of party unity
in his opening comments. He argued that enemies surrounded Soviet Russia on all sides and 
that unity in the party was necessary, adding that the Bolsheviks were in the position of the 
‘most shelled post’ in the world proletarian revolution.51 Stalin framed his case for party unity
in a way that he would repeat in later years. Arguing that the party had become too large to 
allow broad open discussion, he made a comparison to circumstances before the revolution. 
For Stalin, the Bolsheviks were in the same position as they had been in 1912 when 
surrounded by opponents; the difference now was that their ‘enemies’ were on an 
international scale. Moreover, Stalin claimed that there was no reason to doubt that 
preparatory work for a blockade or intervention was not taking place. For this reason, open 
discussion in the party could not be permitted, especially when this discussion concerned the 
most important questions: war and peace. Attacking the suggestion of allowing more liberal 
discussion in the party, Stalin added: ‘We can’t talk about questions of war or peace on the 
streets […] we need to remember that in an environment when we are surrounded by 
enemies, a sudden blow, or unexpected manoeuvre, decides everything.’52
Consequently, when Trotsky and the Left Opposition moved to challenge the party majority 
more concertedly in October 1923, the threatening international situation was again 
emphasised as another reason why this was unacceptable. Most clearly, the resolution from 
the Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission at the end of 
October 1923, which roundly condemned Trotsky and his supporters on the basis of their 
programme and behaviour, noted that ‘we have already entered a period that can be called 
direct combat’ and made reference to current events in Germany and the possibility of war 
against Poland. In this moment, the resolution stated, ‘factional discussion’ was prohibited.53 
Sticking to his past views, Trotsky agreed that factionalism in the party was dangerous when 
war threatened (though by this time he had moderated his opinion on the immediate threat 
from Poland and insisted that relations had improved between the two countries). Important 
for Trotsky, however, was that his criticism of the majority should not be characterised as 
factionalism. Nevertheless, Trotsky had put himself in a difficult position by continuing to 
accept the premise that factionalism was dangerous when war threatened. 
At the end of 1923 the party majority temporarily conceded to party-wide discussions on 
workers’ democracy, but ‘factionalism’ was still ruled out.54 At the same time the ever-
present threats of war and capitalist encirclement continued to raise questions about whether 
more robust party democracy and intraparty criticism were permissible. At the Thirteenth 
Party Conference in January 1924, Stalin made his views on the impossibility of party 
democracy in the context of possible war particularly clear:
I have already said that there is another group of conditions, of an external nature,
and in the absence of these democracy in the Party is impossible. I have in mind 
certain international conditions that would more or less ensure peace and peaceful
development, without which democracy in the Party is inconceivable. In other 
words, if we are attacked and have to defend the country with arms in hand, there 
can be no question of democracy, for it will have to be suspended […] What 
Trotsky offers is deeply mistaken; it runs counter to Bolshevik organisational 
principles and would lead to the inevitable disintegration of the party, to its 
softening, turning it from a single party into a federation of groups. In conditions 
of capitalist encirclement, we need not only a united, not only a skillful, but a 
party of real steel, capable of withstanding the onslaught of the enemies of the 
proletariat, capable of leading the workers to the final battle.55
That Lenin, Stalin, other senior Bolsheviks in the party majority, but also leading 
oppositionists like Trotsky, argued that political freedom was potentially dangerous when 
Soviet Russia existed under capitalist encirclement is not to argue that this was the sole 
consideration for the maintenance of a one-party dictatorship. However, as we have seen, the 
Bolsheviks saw the outside world in more dangerous terms than warranted and this 
understanding of international affairs in turn shaped attitudes towards whether democratic 
practices were permissible. From the Bolsheviks’ point of view, a unified and disciplined 
party dictatorship remained critical for survival in a hostile international environment. It 
certainly ruled out the formation of factions and other political groupings, the central 
accusation levelled against Trotsky and his supporters. And while Trotsky outright rejected 
this characterisation, his endorsements of the nature of foreign threats and the principle of 
unity in the party when war threatened, boxed him into a corner. These same concerns 
emerged again in the late 1920s when another war scare erupted and the opposition once 
more found themselves with little room for manoeuvre. 
The Pi  ł sudski Coup and the War Scare
In the mid-to-late 1920s, Soviet leaders were again preoccupied by the threat of war and 
ordinary people were just as concerned. In 1927 a war scare erupted across the Soviet Union, 
sparking outbreaks of hoarding and panic buying. The war scare in 1927 has sometimes been 
presented in the literature as manufactured by the Soviet leadership and designed as a tool to 
put pressure on the political opposition.56 However, as we have seen, there is little to suggest 
that fears of war emanated solely from above or were designed instrumentally. Soviet 
intelligence reports from the ground level about a new conflict were unremitting in the early 
1920s. Moreover, it was not just the party elite, but Commissariats of Defense and Foreign 
affairs, military intelligence and the political police, which discussed the likelihood of war in 
the near future. There was a shared understanding about the Soviet Union’s precarious 
position in the world and one shaped by a long-held and ideologically-informed 
understanding of international affairs. As we will see, key members of the opposition 
continued to be some, if not the most ardent, supporters of this worldview.
The roots of the 1927 war scare can be found in the still tense relations between the Soviet 
Union and Poland. The country was the subject of increasing anxiety among Soviet leaders in
1926 and, in March, the Polish Commission of the Politburo ordered more attention given to 
Polish affairs.57 Rumours of Piłsudski’s return to power had started to circle, particularly 
following the fall of Aleksander Skrzyński’s government in May. As far as the Bolsheviks 
were concerned, this would greatly escalate the danger of war. The leadership also believed 
that Piłsudski’s return would shift the balance of geopolitical power and push Poland more 
closely towards Britain’s orbit.58 OGPU leaders, Genrikh Iagoda and Artur Artuzov, stressed 
the danger shortly after Piłsudski’s return to power in mid-May and pointed to examples of 
recent aggressive British behaviour towards the Soviet Union, particularly in terms of trade 
restrictions and supposedly large-scale intelligence operations. The assumption was that 
Piłsudski’s return to power was through British design. Notably, Iagoda and Artuzov 
described Piłsudski as the ‘guard dog’ of the British in Eastern Europe and argued that he 
would try once more to forge a Polish federation with Ukraine and Belorussia. In response, 
the OGPU was to strengthen countermeasures against espionage and to keep a close eye on 
Polish affairs.59
Piłsudski’s coup d’état in May was anticipated, but it made the threat of war more pressing 
for the Soviet leadership.60 Piłsudski had already invaded once before during the Soviet–
Polish War and had pushed interventionist stances while sat on the sidelines of Polish 
politics. After the May coup, preventing Polish aggression assumed a greater priority. The 
People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs recommended that Poland be isolated from its 
neighbours to prevent the formation of an anti-Soviet coalition.61 Red Army leaders, who had 
lobbied for higher levels of investment since 1924 on the grounds that Soviet defences could 
not withstand invasion from a coalition of states led by Poland, sounded the alarm again in 
summer 1926. The Soviet Defence Commission subsequently agreed to take ‘urgent 
measures for strengthening the defense potential of the USSR’.62 Tukhachevskii was once 
again sent to the western front (this time to Minsk) and Aleksandr Egorov to Kharkov.63 
Some regarded the situation as highly dangerous. Before his death in July, Dzerzhinskii 
vehemently argued that Piłsudski would now try to seize Belorussia and Ukraine, a warning 
he relayed personally to Stalin.64 On the ground in Ukraine, GPU agents reported on the 
renewed hope among separatists that Soviet defeat at the hands of Poland would bring about 
their independence.65 
Not all were as alarmist as Dzerzhinskii, but even more measured appraisals of Soviet–Polish
relations emphasised the dangerous environment after Piłsudski’s return to power. People’s 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Chicherin, was gloomy about the recent turn of events, 
writing to the OGPU head that Poland was trying to conclude agreements with the Baltic 
States, forcing the threat from Poland to be taken seriously.66 Soviet military intelligence 
forecast growing Polish militarism - and with it the threat of war - but its agents believed that 
the Soviet Union was safe from attack until at least spring 1927.67 The situation was bad, but 
it was not yet a crisis. Military intelligence rightly estimated that Poland required external 
assistance to build its military strength. Ultimately, however, should Poland be ready and 
pressured into war by Britain, it would represent a serious adversary.68 
As to how Stalin judged the threat of war in the late 1920s, in public he sided with the view 
of military intelligence rather than with the alarmist Dzerzhinskii. In his speech to the 
Fifteenth Party Conference in November 1926, Stalin proclaimed that whether capitalist 
states were in a position to attack was still to be seen, but regardless, the Soviet Union 
remained in a position of encirclement. This was not a moment of respite and war could not 
be ruled out.69 It is possible that Stalin downplayed the threat for the benefit of the 
conference. Indeed, a few months later in February 1927, Maksim Litvinov suggested to 
Stalin that there was no reliable information that Britain was pushing Poland towards war. 
Stalin raked him over the coals and spoke about the existence of an international conspiracy 
against the Soviet Union and the inevitability of war.70 Stalin’s close allies were evidently in 
agreement. In mid-1927, Lazar Kaganovich accused Piłsudski of waging a war against 
Moscow to seize Ukraine and claimed that Polish fascism was backed by ‘foreign 
imperialism’.71 
Stalin’s appraisal of the nature of the Polish threat is also revealed in his reaction to the 
murder of Petr Voikov, the Soviet plenipotentiary in Poland, by a White monarchist in June 
1927. In a telegram sent to Viacheslav Molotov immediately after Voikov’s death, and 
relying on his gut instincts, Stalin wrote that he ‘felt the hand of England’ behind Voikov’s 
murder and suggested that the British government wanted to provoke war between Poland 
and the Soviet Union, repeating ‘Sarajevo’.72 The allusion to the assassination of Franz 
Ferdinand is suggestive of the danger that Stalin saw in Piłsudski’s Poland under British 
influence. The British government had already severed diplomatic relations with the Soviet 
Union one month before, following raids on the Soviet trade delegation and All-Russian Co-
operative Society in London that the British authorities believed were fronts for Soviet 
intelligence.73 
Yet despite seeing a British conspiracy to wage war, Stalin still did not judge this as 
imminent in 1926 or 1927. Writing in Pravda in July 1927, Stalin accused the British 
government of preparing war against the Soviet Union but argued that this had been 
forestalled for two reasons: the peaceful policies carried out by the Soviet Union and the 
reluctance of countries such as Poland to ‘serve as dumb tools of the [British] Conservatives 
to the detriment of their own interests.’ Even so, Stalin claimed that capitalist powers would 
not stop in trying to provoke war and the immediate task facing the Soviet Union was to 
improve its economic power and military strength.74
Renewed Pressure on the Opposition
Heightened concerns about war against Piłsudski’s Poland and its capitalist backers placed 
more pressure on the political opposition at the height of its activity. Concerns about war 
continued to circumscribe open party discussion as had been true in previous years and 
created new concerns about the opposition undermining state defence. Dzerzhinskii saw 
internal disputes in the party as dangerous with Piłsudski back in power. In July 1926, he 
claimed that Piłsudski would detect weakness in the Soviet state because of the activity of the
opposition.75 While Stalin was not as adamant as Dzerzhinskii about the imminence of war, 
he conveyed similar messages regarding the continuing dangers posed by factionalism. At the
Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International 
(ECCI) in December 1926, he argued that a ‘united party armed with iron discipline’ was 
essential when imperialism was such a strong force in the world. In this context, attempts to 
undermine party unity or create a new party had to be ‘rooted out’. In May 1927, again at a 
plenum of the ECCI, Stalin referred to a ‘united front from Chamberlain to Trotsky.’76 Stalin 
followed this up in a Pravda article from July 1927 containing another scathing attack on the 
opposition: 
What, after all this, should be said of our luckless opposition in connection with 
its latest attacks on our Party in face of the threat of a new war? What should be 
said of the fact that it, this opposition, has found the war threat an appropriate 
occasion to intensify its attacks on the Party? What is there creditable in the fact 
that, instead of rallying around the Party in face of the threat from without, it 
considers it appropriate to make use of the U.S.S.R.'s difficulties for new attacks 
on the Party? Can it be that the opposition is against the victory of the U.S.S.R. in
the coming battles with imperialism, against increasing the defensive capacity of 
the Soviet Union, against strengthening our rear?77
One month later, in another speech, Stalin explicitly connected the internal and external 
threats to the Soviet Union:
Comrades, we are faced by two dangers: the danger of war, which has become the
threat of war; and the danger of the degeneration of some of the links of our 
Party. In setting out to prepare for defence we must create iron discipline in our 
Party. Without such discipline defence is impossible. We must strengthen Party 
discipline, we must curb all those who are disorganising our Party.78
Other senior Bolsheviks shared this view and likewise argued that the opposition was 
undermining Soviet defence and even threatened to stab the country in the back during war.79
Trotsky denied this volley of accusations and argued on the contrary that the opposition was 
the only group capable of steering the country through tense international times. Other 
members of the opposition lower down the chain took the same view and saw their 
programme as necessary for successful navigation of the international environment, 
especially curbing the influence of kulaks, as not doing so risked creating an internal front 
during war.80 As part of his defence, Trotsky provocatively made reference to Georges 
Clémenceau who had remained in opposition to French government during World War I until
there was opportunity to take the leadership. After a backlash, Trotsky clarified his position 
in September 1927, arguing that his comments had been distorted and rejected the accusation 
that the opposition threatened to take power ‘after the Clémenceau manner’. Yet at the same 
time, he again accepted the need for unity when war threatened: ‘The dictatorship of the 
proletariat in a country which is surrounded by capitalist states does not allow either the 
existence of two parties or the factional splitting of a unified party.’ For Trotsky, the problem 
remained the party elite’s circumscribing of open discussion and its unaccountability. For 
him, the threat of war had no bearing on this: ‘It is a lie that the danger or even war itself 
excludes the self-action of the party, which discusses and decides all questions and which 
directs and checks all its organs from top to bottom.’81 
In making this case, Trotsky faced exactly the same problem as in 1923. He continued to 
agree that the Soviet Union would be endangered if the party split into factions and that unity 
was required in the face of war with the capitalist world. On the latter danger, Trotsky was 
unequivocal in 1927, writing to the Central Committee in June that the threat of intervention 
was ‘unquestionable’.82 Moreover, in the Platform of the United Opposition, produced in 
1927, he argued:
Another task of equal importance is to consolidate the ranks of our party, to put 
an end to the open speculation of the imperialist bourgeoisie and the leaders of 
Social Democracy on a split […] All the organs of the international bourgeoisie 
and the Social Democrats are now showing a quite unusual interest in our inner-
party disputes. They are openly encouraging and spurring on the present majority 
of the Central Committee to exclude the Opposition from the leading organs of 
the party, and if possible from the party […] Moreover, we can buy ourselves off 
from a war, if that is possible – and conquer in the war, if we have to fight – only 
if we preserve complete unity; if we disappoint the hopes of the imperialists for a 
split or an amputation. Such a thing would benefit only the capitalists.83
For Trotsky, party unity would be damaged and the Soviet Union endangered if the 
opposition was expelled. The party majority saw the exact opposite. Indeed, Trotsky’s 
conception of party unity meant ‘above all maximum active participation by the entire mass 
of the party.’84 The majority saw this as unacceptable considering the international threats 
facing the Soviet Union. Even to allow more open discussion was regarded as potentially 
dangerous. The nature of political participation was thus the crux of the dispute and positions 
were irreconcilable. However, there was one crucial point of agreement. Trotsky fatally 
undermined his position by accepting the need for unity when war was on the horizon. In fact
the danger posed by the outside world had not been seriously disputed since 1917. The 
controversy was in how the party should respond and what exactly constituted ‘unity’. And 
there was no chance that the party leadership would liberalise democratic practices when it 
judged the threat of war as acute. Critically, Trotsky did nothing to dispel this worldview. 
The conclusion therefore should not be that the party majority used the war threat 
instrumentally to crush internal critics. That Stalin wanted Trotsky out of the way was no 
secret, but as we have seen, the party, the opposition (and wider population in 1927) were 
convinced that it would not be long until the Soviet Union was at war. This was a long-
standing conviction within Bolshevik circles that stemmed from their understanding of the 
international circumstances of the revolution. As far as the Bolsheviks were concerned, reams
of intelligence, the evidence of hostile action foreign governments and war scares in the 
1920s supported this worldview. If anything, Trotsky’s firm endorsement of future war only 
further cemented an authoritarian response to the challenges posed by the outside world and 
with it the maintenance of a one-party vanguard dictatorship with diminishing democratic 
standards.
Following Trotsky’s expulsion from the Soviet Union, the international situation worsened in
a very real sense in the 1930s. The response from the Soviet leadership was the further 
sharpening of the dictatorship and an increasing use of political violence. All the while, 
Trotsky remained a thorn in the regime’s side from exile. His continuing opposition from 
abroad in turn became integral to the conspiracy theories that underpinned the Great Terror, 
themselves inseparable from the threat of war.
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